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Abstract 
 
 
This paper presents a model of convergence/divergence in productivity for 
two economies of different size and development building on Kaldor’s 
cumulative causation and the technological gap approaches to growth.  
Both operate within the logic provided by a balance-of-payments 
constraint framework. The more developed and larger economy, the 
leader, is technologically more advanced with higher levels of productivity 
and issues the international reserve currency. The developing economy, 
the follower, is closely linked to the leader economy and is balance-of-
payments-constrained (BPC). The paper argues that the growth of the 
leader has at the same time divergent and convergent effects on the 
productivity gap between both economies. The divergent effect (the 
Kaldor effect) works through a process of induced productivity and 
cumulative causation. The convergent effect (Thirlwall’s Law) works 
through the BPC constraint. The model states that growth with 
convergence in productivity requires that the ratio of export to import 
income elasticities of the follower economy exceeds the ratio of the 
induced productivity of the leader economy to that of the follower 
economy. The paper then highlights the difficulty of achieving 
convergence under a BPC constraint and provides policy implications. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper presents a model of convergence/divergence in productivity for two 
economies of different size and development. More precisely the model postulates the 
existence of leader and follower economies. The leader has higher levels of productivity 
and is technologically more advanced. The follower economy is closely linked to the 
leader economy. Finally, the leader economy issues the international reserve currency. 
 
The model presented builds on Kaldor’s cumulative causation and the 
technological gap approaches to growth.  Both operate within the logic of a balance-of-
payments constraint framework.2  
 
The cumulative causation approach views growth as being internally generated. 
Technological innovation generates, through the rise of embodied or disembodied 
productivity, growth in demand which feeds back into productivity growth. The growth 
linkage between productivity and demand is explained by terms-of-trade effects, 
increased income and expenditure, and changes in income distribution. The linkage from 
demand to productivity is explained by returns to scale, specialization and market size, 
embodied technical progress and learning by doing (Castellacci, 2001). Seen from this 
perspective, growth is generated internally through innovation activity.  
 
A limitation of this approach is that it does not contemplate that growth in 
demand could also be generated externally through technological spillovers between 
countries or that the international diffusion of technology can, in fact, occur through 
inter-country linkages. This is one of the main hypotheses of the technological gap 
approach which complements the cumulative causation approach described above. 
 
The technological gap approach asserts that a country’s growth rate depends on its 
level of technological development. It also states that countries whose technological level 
is below the world innovation frontier can increase their rate of growth through a process 
of “catching up” or imitation. Lastly, the absorptive capacity of such countries depends 
on their “ability to mobilize resources for transforming social, institutional and economic 
structures” (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2001, p. 11). The technological gap approach 
recognizes that all countries are not alike, that development levels are an important 
determinant of growth and welfare and that not all countries benefit to a similar extent 
from trade and the transmission of trade linkages. 
 
Cumulative causation and the technological gap approaches to growth operate in 
the model here presented within an external constraint encapsulated by the balance-of-
payments constraint (BPC). This framework asserts that inter-country linkages and 
growth cannot be understood or analysed in real or “barter” terms. Trade and growth are 
intimately linked to the architecture and workings of the existing international financial 
                                                 
2
 Our view of Kaldor’s cumulative causation and the balance-of-payments constraint framework follows 
the work of McCombie and Thirlwall (1994), McCombie, Pugno and Soro (2002), Thirlwall (1979) and 
McCombie and Thirlwall (1994). 
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order and the provision of liquidity that these are a fundamental constraint on economic 
growth and development.3 
 
Economic relationships among countries are carried out in money terms and more 
precisely in terms of the international reserve currency or a given set of currencies. 
Countries can build up their economic infrastructure and develop by importing capital, 
raw materials, inputs and technology only if they are able to acquire the reserve currency 
or set of currencies (i.e., access to liquidity), which the great majority of countries cannot 
issue. As a result, countries’ export potential must be commensurate with their import 
capacity. 
 
Over the long run, consequently, countries that do not issue the international 
reserve currency, the follower economy in the model, must maintain equilibrium in the 
balance of payments or at least in the basic balance, since in the long run these countries 
(including the follower country) can only grow at rates compatible with their external 
position. It is in this sense that countries are said to be balance-of-payments-constrained.4 
 
Within the logic of the model presented, for any given parameters, the rate of 
growth compatible with balance-of-payments equilibrium of the follower economy sets a 
boundary (a constraint), on the extent to which the workings of the cumulative causation 
mechanism and spillover ‘technology’ effects from the leader to the follower economy 
affect the productivity gap. In this sense, depending on the current circumstances at hand 
the convergent (divergent) effects in productivity will be greater (smaller) the greater is 
the BPC rate of growth of the follower economy. 
 
Thus contrary to mainstream approaches, financial and monetary factors captured 
by the BPC constraint provide the framework for the operation and development of real 
forces, such as productivity. In other words, money and finance are fundamental 
determinants not only of growth but also of convergence. 
 
The paper is divided in five sections. The first section presents the basics of the 
model. Section two and three provide the solutions to the model with and without capital 
flows and highlights the main implications. The fourth section introduces knowledge 
spillover effects. The fifth section presents the final thoughts.  
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 This interpretation follows Davidson (1992, pp. 93-96; 2002, pp. 158-161). 
4
 Countries are balance-of-payments-constrained in the sense that “their performance in overseas markets, 
and the response of the world financial markets to this performance, constrains the rate of growth of the 
economy to a rate which is below that which internal conditions would warrant” (McCombie and Thirlwall, 
1999, p. 49). On the basis of the above definition Pérez Caldentey (2009b/) defines the notion of balance-
of-payments-constraint as follows “countries are said to be balance-of-payments constrained when their 
(current and expected) performance in overseas markets, and the response of the world financial markets to 
this (current and expected) performance, shapes and constrains their domestic policy space, including that 
of fiscal and monetary policy.” 
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The model’s building blocks 
 
The model begins by defining the technology gap (Gp) between the leader and the 
follower economy (Pl and Pf, respectively) in logarithmic terms such that the rate of 
growth of the gap (g) can be expressed as the difference between the rates of productivity 
change in the leader and follower country (  and p pl f respectively) (McCombie and 
Thirlwall, 1994; Targetti and Foti, 1997). That is, 
 
(1)  ( / )p l fG Ln P P=  
 
(2) l fg p p= −  
The rates of productivity growth in the leader and follower economies are equal to 
the sum of the rates of growth of autonomous (exogenous) and induced productivities. 
That is, they are modelled according to Verdoorn’s Law.5 The interpretation of the 
autonomous and induced coefficients adopted in this paper is that of Dixon and Thirlwall 
(1975) and McCombie and Thirlwall (1994).6 
 
As stated by McCombie and Thirlwall (1994, p. 464), autonomous productivity 
(denoted below by l ap  and f ap  for the leader and the follower respectively)  depends on 
“the autonomous rate of disembodied technical progress, the autonomous rate of capital 
accumulation, and the degree to which technical progress is embodied in capital 
accumulation”. For obvious reasons, the rate of autonomous productivity growth is 
higher in the leader economy than in the smaller country (i.e., l a fap p> ). 
 
For its part, induced productivity is captured by the parameter λ (denoted by 
lλ and fλ  for the leader and the follower) also known as the Verdoorn coefficient. Again 
as stated by McCombie and Thirlwall (1994), it is a function of ‘learning by doing’, the 
degree to which capital accumulation is induced by economic growth (denoted by yl and 
yf  for the leader and follower respectively) and the extent to which technical progress is 
embodied in capital accumulation”.7 As well the induced productivity coefficient in the 
leader country is higher than that in the follower (i.e., l fλ λ> ).  
 
 
                                                 
5
 Verdoorn’s Law is a “statistical relationship between the long-run rate of growth of labour productivity 
and the rate of growth of output, usually in the industrial sector” (McCombie, Pugno and Soro, 2002, p. 1). 
This relationship was formulated by Verdoorn (1949) and restated as a law by Kaldor (1966). 
6
 Soro (2002, pp. 45-53) considers three interpretations of Verdoorn’s Law. The first two were suggested 
by Verdoorn and are based on complementarity and perfect substitutability of the factors of production. 
The third, which is the one adopted in this paper, follows the Kaldorian interpretation. A key component of 
Kaldor’s interpretation is the existence of increasing returns to scale. Following Young (1928), Kaldor 
subscribed to a macroeconomic rather than microeconomic concept of increasing returns. See Soro (2002) 
and Chandra and Sandilands (2005). 
7
 A value of λ > 0.5 indicates the presence of increasing returns. 
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The productivity equations are thus specified as follows,  
 
l(3)     l la lp p yλ= +  
 
(4)     f fa f fp p yλ= +  
Note that, as formulated, equations (3) and (4) capture the presence of increasing 
returns due to the greater specialization induced by economic growth.8 In turn, a greater 
degree of specialization entails a higher rate of growth, which permits the expansion of 
the potential for specialization. Hence, the process described by equations (3) and (4) is 
cumulative. 
 
As stated earlier, the follower economy is balance-of-payments-constrained. That 
is, its rate of growth has to conform in the long run to the rate of growth consistent with 
balance-of-payments equilibrium. Such is not the case with the leader economy because 
it issues the international reserve currency.9 Formally, the balance-of-payments constraint 
growth rate of the follower country can be expressed as a function of exogenous changes 
in the terms of trade [1], changes in real capital flows [2] and exogenous changes in the 
level of external income [3],   
 
 
 
                       [1]                              [2]              [3] 
 
The variables in Eq. (5) are denoted as follows: bpcfy is the rate of growth of the 
follower economy that is compatible with equilibrium in the balance of payments; dfp is 
the rate of change of domestic prices; *p is the rate of change of foreign prices; ly is the 
rate of growth of the leader (i.e., external income); f is the rate of change in nominal 
financial flows; e is the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate. The parameters are 
denoted as follows: γ  is the price elasticity of demand for imports ( 0γ < );ψ is the price 
elasticity of demand for exports ( 0ψ < ); ξ is the income elasticity of demands for 
                                                 
8
 This means that increasing returns derive from specialization rather than scale. This is the position of 
Allyn Young and Nicholas Kaldor. See Young (1990). 
9
 This is, at this stage of our work, a very simple assumption and the authors are cognizant that in a more 
complicated context the leader economy will not be able to maintain indefinite cumulative external deficits. 
Eventually as debt increases and becomes harder to service and finance creditors will expect, at some point, 
some kind of default and will be reluctant to hold the leader’s currency and its currency denominated 
assets. The upper bound on how much of the leader’s debt creditors are willing to hold may depend on a 
host of factors including past history, sovereignty issues (increasing foreign debt implies of the leader 
economy  implies that foreigners owe a greater share of the nation’s resources) and expectations. See, Pérez 
Caldentey (2009) for a discussion of this issue along Keynes’ arguments put forward in the General Theory 
(1936) and the Tract on Monetary Reform (1923).  
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imports ( 0ξ > ); pi is the income elasticity of demand for exports and θ  and η are the 
proportions of the total import bill financed with export earnings and capital flows, 
respectively.10 
 
 According to Eq.(5), the rate of growth of output of the follower economy is 
positively related to the rate of growth of external demand and weighted by the ratio of 
the export-to-import elasticities. The rate of expansion of real financial inflows also 
exerts a positive effect on output.  
 
In a consistent manner with the approach adopted, we assume that the follower 
economy is a small economy and thus for all purposes takes prices as given so that the 
rate of growth of income of the follower country that is consistent with balance-of-
payments constrained equilibrium depends on external demand  [3]  and on real capital 
flows [2].11 In this context real capital flows finance “growth in excess of the rate of 
growth consistent with equilibrium on the current account” (Thirlwall, 2000). 
 
 
bpcf
l y
ypf
=+
−
ξ
pi
ξ
η )()6(   BPC rate of growth of the follower country with capital flows. 
 
In the limiting case where, the current account is in equilibrium, that is 1  =0andθ η= , 
the balance of payments constrained rate of growth ( )bpc fy  is expressed solely as a 
function of the rate of growth of world income and the income elasticities for exports and 
imports, that is financial flows have no influence on it. Formally, 
 
bpcf
l yy =ξ
pi)7(   BPC of growth of the follower country with no capital flows. 
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 The rate of growth of an economy that is compatible with equilibrium in the balance of payments (Eq. 
(5)) is derived from a three equation model. The first is the rate of growth of imports expressed as a 
function of the real exchange rate and the rate of growth of the follower economy 
( *( )m p e p yf df fψ ξ= + − + ); the second is the rate of growth of exports expressed as a function of the 
real exchange rate and the rate of growth of the leader economy ( *( )x p p e yf ldfγ pi= − − + ); the third 
provides a dynamic equilibrium condition for the overall balance of payments equilibrium 
( *( )p x f p m edf fθ η+ + = + + ). Eq. (5) is then obtained by substituting the import and export equations 
into the equilibrium condition and solving for the rate of growth of the follower country.  
11
 The small country assumption is a convenient way to place the emphasis on income as opposed to 
substitution effects. The importance given to substitution effects in mainstream theory follows from the 
acceptance of the gross substitution axiom which views any good as a substitute of any other good. The 
gross substitution axiom presumes that money and finance are neutral, that is they play no role in the 
determination of real variables. Contrarily in the model here presented money and finance play a 
fundamental role in the determination of the international payments balance and real variables such as the 
determination of the rate of growth of output. See Davidson (1992, pp.87-91) for a critical analysis of 
balance of payments’ real adjustment mechanisms including relative price adjustments predominant in 
mainstream economics.  
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Equation (7) is known as Thirwall’s Law. It postulates that the long-term growth rate of 
the follower economy (yf) is determined by the long-term growth rate of the leader 
economy (yl) multiplied by the income-elasticity ratio between the follower country’s 
exports to the rest of the world (pi) and the income-elasticity of its demand for imports 
(ξ).  
 
The BPC literature presents three different hypotheses regarding the determinants 
of the income-elasticities of imports and exports. The first follows from Prebisch and 
Singer and relates the size of the elasticity parameters to the manufacturing and 
technological content of the products exported and imported. According to this reasoning, 
the income-elasticity of exports increases as external sales move up the value-added 
chain from commodities to semiprocessed labour- and resource- intensive goods, then to 
manufactures with low, medium and high skill and technology content. In the case of 
developing economies, the income-elasticity of demand for their exports in the rest of the 
world is low and the income-elasticity of their demand for imports is high. Less 
developed countries exporting commodities subject to Engel’s Law are usually in this 
category (Davidson, 1992). The main policy implication, following the logic of 
Thirlwall’s Law, is that unless countries undergo a process of structural change that alters 
the elasticity parameters, the cleavage between developed and developing economies will 
widen over time and less developed countries are condemned to poverty.  
 
The second hypothesis states that while the income-elasticity of a country’s 
demand for imports tends to remain more or less constant, the income-elasticity of its 
exports to the rest of the world varies over time with the level of development (Bairam, 
1997). More specifically, the income-elasticity of demand for a country’s exports in the 
rest of the world is inversely related to its level of development and tends to decline as 
this level rises. As a result, increases in external demand or expansionary phases in the 
global cycle (or that of the country’s main trading partners) have a positive effect on 
developing countries’ external position.  
 
The third hypothesis maintains that changes in the said income-elasticities are 
brought about by shifts in commercial policy or measures designed to transfer liquidity 
between countries, or both. Changes in commercial policy involve changes in trade 
barriers (tariffs and quotas). Measures to recycle liquidity comprise increases in surplus 
nations’ imports and unilateral transfers from surplus to deficit nations (Davidson, 1992, 
p. 153).  
 
The available empirical work shows that the income-elasticity of imports tends to 
rise with trade liberalization and that the income-elasticity of exports depends on what 
the market and consumers and producers are demanding at a given time. Thus, while the 
income-elasticity of imports depends on institutional factors which include changes in 
commercial policy, as per the third hypothesis, there seems to be no clear core factor 
determining the income-elasticity of exports. 
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The solution to the model without capital flows 
Starting with the no capital flows case, substitution of equation (7) above into 
equation (4) and of equations (4) and (3) into equation (2) yields the following expression 
for the rate of change in the productivity gap, 
 
))(()()()8( ξ
piλλξ
piλλ fllfalalfllfala ypp
y
yppg −+−<=>





−+−=
 
Equation (8) shows that the rate of change in the productivity gap over time will 
depend on three factors: (i) the differences in autonomous productivities ( p pla fa− ); (ii) 
the induced productivity of the leader economy ( l lyλ ); (iii) Thirlwall’s Law weighted 
by the induced productivity of the follower economy ( ( )lf
ypiλ ξ ). By contrast to other 
approaches found in the literature, relative prices do not play a role in the workings of 
Verdoorn’s law.12 
 
According to equation (8) when the leader economy’s growth rate tends to zero 
( 0ly − > ), the rate of growth in the productivity gap (g) is equal to the difference 
between the autonomous productivities ( la fap p− ). The difference is by assumption of 
the model positive and thus under this case both economies diverge. This is a case of 
absolute divergence. 
 
When the leader economy exhibits positive rates of growth (and assuming that the 
difference in autonomous productivities between the leader and follower economies is 
equal to zero (pla – pfa = 0)) there are simultaneous divergence and convergence effects. 
Both of these are examined in turn under the assumption of constant induced productivity 
and income elasticity parameters.  
 
On the one hand, a positive rate of growth of the leader economy generates a 
divergence effect that works through the induced productivity of the leader economy 
( l ly λ ). An increase in ly  translates into an increase in g (productivity gap) of 
magnitude lλ . And other things remaining the same, the greater is the rate of growth of 
                                                 
12
 As indicated in Footnote 11, the approach adopted in this paper follows the post-Keynesian tradition in 
emphasizing income over substitution effects (Davidson, 1992, p. 22). According to this view, relative 
prices do not play a role in the determination the long-run GDP growth rate or the productivity gap. See 
Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) and León-Ledesma (2002) for a different approach in which the effect of 
Verdoorn’s Law works through relative prices. In Ledesma (2002), exports are a function of relative prices 
which are then made dependent on the difference between the wage rate and productivity. Thus 
productivity determines (for a given wage rate) prices and through relative prices, exports and hence the 
rate of output growth. This transmission channel is not included in the model for the conceptual reasons 
provided in footnote 11 and moreover because the various empirical estimates of the demand for exports 
which show that the relative price variable is not statistically significant.  
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the leader economy the greater is the productivity gap (i.e., the greater is the divergence). 
We term this effect, which is a growth without convergence effect, the ‘Kaldor-effect.’    
At the same time, the rate of growth of the leader economy produces a convergent 
effect. The convergence effect stems from the workings of Thirlwall’s Law. An increase 
in the rate of growth of the leader economy has a pull effect on the follower economy in 
the same direction.  The strength of the pull effect is dependent on the ratio of income 
elasticities ( )piξ weighted by the induced productivity coefficient of the follower economy 
( fλ ). We term this growth with convergence effect, the ‘Thirwall-effect’. 
 
While both effects coexist, whether ultimately the productivity of the follower 
economy converges or diverges from that of the leader will thus depend on the relative 
strengths of the Kaldor and Thirlwall effects. This in turn depends on the size of the 
different parameters involved, that is on the size of the induced productivities ( lλ  and 
fλ ) and on that of the income elasticities (pi and ξ ).  
 
More precisely, the rate of change in the gap will increase, decrease or be equal to 
zero depending on whether the ratio of the income (import and export) elasticities of the 
follower country weighted by its induced productivity coefficient is greater than, less 
than or equal to the induced productivity coefficient of the leader country. Alternatively, 
this can be stated in the following way: the rate of change in the gap will increase, 
decrease or be equal to zero depending on whether the ratio of the induced productivity 
coefficients between the leader and follower economies is greater than, less than or equal 
to the ratio between the income-elasticity of the follower country’s exports to the rest of 
the world and the income-elasticity of its imports. Formally, 
 
           >0                                   >0          >                         >                Divergent effect. 
ξ
pi
λ
λ
ξ
piλλξ
piλλ =⇔=⇔=−<=>=
f
l
flfllyg )(0))((0)9(             Neutral effect. 
         <0                                    <0           <                         <               Convergent effect. 
 
Since the model by assumption postulates that l fλ λ> convergence requires not only that  
pi ξ>  but that in addition their difference must be wide enough to outweigh the 
differences between 
 and l fλ λ .  
 
The solution to the model including capital flows 
 
Adding capital flows to the model does not modify substantially the above 
conclusions. In this case, the rate of change of the productivity gap will depend not only  
on the determinants identified previously but also on real capital flows adjusted for the 
induced productivity of the follower country. Formally, 
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 When considered in isolation, capital flows will reduce the productivity gap, that 
is, they have a convergent effect. They have a negative sign and as a result, other things 
remaining the same, an increase in the rate of growth of capital flows will result in a 
negative rate of growth of the productivity gap (i.e., the productivity gap will narrow). 
The extent to which capital flows are able, under the caeteris paribus assumption, of 
narrowing the productivity gap will depend on the productivity of the follower economy 
relative to its import elasticity )( ξ
λl
. The more productive is the follower economy and 
the less it relies on imports (or the greater its import productivity), the more potent will 
be the capital flow effect.13 
 
When viewed in interaction with the rate of growth of the leader economy, the 
incorporation of capital flows is justified only under the assumption that the import 
elasticity is greater than the export elasticity (ξ pi> ). In this case the follower country 
will have a recurrent deficit in its current account and will require capital flows to 
balance its balance of payments.  If as assumed in the model, l fλ λ> and ξ pi> , then  it 
follows that l
f
λ pi
λ ξ>  (i.e., the Kaldor effect is greater than the Thirlwall effect) and as 
result, for a positive rate of growth of the leader economy ( ly ), capital flows will have a 
convergent role only if the rate of growth of capital flows weighted by the induced 
productivity of the follower economy (i.e., the capacity of the follower economy to use 
capital flows productively) is able to compensate and outweigh for the predominance of 
the Kaldor effect over the Thirlwall effect. Formally,  
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 We owe the term ‘import productivity’ to Vanus James (University of the West Indies, MONA Campus, 
Jamaica) who introduced it to us in 2005 during a conference organized by the Caribbean Center for 
Monetary Studies. 
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The model with spillover knowledge effects 
Up to this point the model was developed on the basis that the only interaction 
between the leader and the follower economies occurred through the rate of growth of the 
leader economy. However, when countries trade and become interdependent, there are 
other types of spillover effects between both. A significant spillover effect is the diffusion 
of knowledge which is actually an important vehicle for the transmission of economic 
development. 14 In this section the model incorporates the developmental dimension to 
the growth impact on the productivity gap.  
 
Furthermore, in addition to the above limitation, the explicit causality in the 
model ran from autonomous and induced productivities (Kaldor’s effect), capital flows 
and Thirwall’s Law (Thirlwall effect) to the productivity gap without due consideration 
for the possible endogeneity from the productivity gap ( g ) to induced productivities. The 
introduction of the developmental aspect of the interaction between both economies in 
the form of knowledge corrects for this shortcoming by postulating that the learning 
capacity of the follower economy is dependent on the size of the productivity gap.  
 
Within the setting of our model, both aspects are incorporated by postulating that 
the spillover effects of knowledge are transmitted from the bigger, more developed 
economy (the leader) to the smaller, less developed one (the follower) via the absorptive 
or learning capacity of the latter. The induced productivity of the follower economy is 
made a function of the absorptive capacity. The greater is the absorptive capacity of the 
follower, the more powerful the knowledge spillover effect.15 However, absorptive 
capacity is limited by the extent of the productivity gap between the two economies and 
thus the induced productivity of the follower economy is endogenous to the productivity 
gap.16   
 
For the sake of analytical simplicity and without sacrificing any of the analytical 
contents, the bulk of the analysis that follows takes into consideration the case with no 
capital flows.  That is, it assumes that the follower economy maintains equilibrium in its 
balance of payments. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 See Helpman (2004, pp. 60-69) and Rogers (2004). 
15
 According to Abramovitz (1979, 1986 and 1995), countries can realize their catch-up potential if they 
exhibit “social capability” and “technological congruence” and possess natural resource endowments. The 
term “social capability” includes a wide variety of factors, including social attitudes and political 
institutions, educational attainment, organizational and commercial skills and adequate levels of 
infrastructure. The term “technological congruence” refers to the fact that technology in the leader 
economy may not always be appropriate for the follower economy (Verspagen and Los, 2002; Criscuolo 
and Narula, 2002). 
16
 See Nelson and Phelps (1966), Abramovitz (1986), Targetti and Foti (1997) and Rogers (2004). 
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Following Targetti and Foti (1997), induced productivity can be modeled as a 
non-linear function of the gap. Formally, 
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Where, 
 
a = factor of proportionality. 
ϕ = (1/G0) = inverse of the initial productivity gap and 0 < ϕ < 1. 
θ = parameter reflecting the adaptability or learning capacity of the follower economy. 
 According to equation (12), induced productivity in the follower country is 
proportional to the inverse of the initial productivity gap. That is, the greater (smaller) the 
initial productivity gap, the lower (higher) ϕ will be and, other things being equal, the 
weaker (stronger) the spillover effect. 
 
Equation (12) is also a function of the extent to which the follower economy is 
able to acquire and incorporate knowledge from the leader economy (i.e., of the 
absorptive or learning capacity of the follower economy).17 This is captured by e-G/θ . The 
basic mathematical properties of equation (12) are listed below and figure 1 plots the 
function. 
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 Absorptive capacity is defined by Dahlman and Nelson (1995) as “the ability to learn and implement the 
technologies and associated practices of already developed countries”. It is a narrower concept than “social 
capability”. According to Rogers (2004, p. 579), absorptive or learning capacity depends on “accessibility 
to overseas technology, learning ability, and the incentives or barriers to implementing new technologies”. 
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FIGURE 1 Induced productivity of the follower country  
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
Induced productivity is an increasing function of the parameter θ. However, as θ 
increases, induced productivity tends to the limit (1/G0). That is, the extent to which the 
follower country is able to use its learning capacity to catch up with the leader economy 
is bounded by the initial productivity gap (G0). This is in fact the boundary of the 
country’s learning capacity. The greater the initial productivity gap, the lower the 
“learning capacity boundary”, as shown in figure 1 by the difference between the 
continuous straight line (corresponding to G0) and the dashed straight line (corresponding 
to Gl0 and Gl0 > G0). Similarly, any increase in the actual gap, whatever its initial size, 
reduces the follower’s induced productivity. This too is shown in figure 1, by the 
difference between the straight and dashed lines of induced productivities (λf and λf1, 
respectively), which correspond to different sizes of gap (G and G1, respectively, where 
G1 > G). 
 
Substituting equation (15) into equation (12) yields the following expression for 
the rate of change in the gap: 
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piϕλξ
piϕλ θθ
G
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As stated previously and in consonance with the logic of the model, equation (14) 
shows that when the rate of growth of the leader country tends to zero (i.e., 0ly → ) the 
difference in autonomous productivities between the leader and follower countries has an 
a(1/ Go) 
θ 
λf =a (1/ Go)(e-G/θ) 
a(1/G1o) 
λf1 =a (1/ Go)(e-G1/θ) 
 
G1o<Go and G1<G 
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absolute divergence effect (i.e., 0al afg p p= − > ). As well, positive rates of growth of 
the leader economy ( ly >0) have at the same time convergent and divergent effects on the 
productivity gap.   
 
The divergent effect is given by the ‘Kaldor effect’ ( l ly λ ). It is the same as that 
identified in the previous section. The convergent effect is captured, as in the previous 
section, by Thirwall’s Law ( ly
pi
ξ ). In addition, once spillovers are introduced, this 
convergent effect is weighted by the initial productivity gap (G) and the extent to which 
the follower country can benefit from the spillover effects, which basically depends on its 
adaptability or learning capacity (θ). And again, a positive rate of growth of the leader 
economy ( ly >0) will result in convergence or divergence in productivity between both 
economies depending on whether the Thirlwall effect can (or cannot) outweigh the 
Kaldor effect.  Formally,  
 
(15) 
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A summing-up of the model and its policy implications 
 
 The paper develops a leader-follower model to determine the possibility of 
convergence or divergence between a developed and developing economy. The leader 
(developed) economy is typified as the larger and more technologically advanced of the 
two and also as the economy which provides the international reserve currency. The 
developed economy is the motor of growth of this two-economy world. The model builds 
on the notion of cumulative causation and the technological gap approach and the 
workings of both are bounded by the balance-of-payments constraint which applies to the 
developing (follower) economy.  
 
 The model shows that when the leader economy expands its rate of growth, the 
follower economy also grows. That is, it postulates a co-movement in growth between 
developed and developing economies (provided their linkages are strong as postulated in 
the model). For obvious reasons, this makes the follower economy also susceptible to 
downturns when the growth of the leader economy contracts.  
 
However, the model shows that co-movement in growth does not mean narrowing 
the divergence in the productivity gap when the leader economy grows. The model in fact 
distinguished between divergence induced growth and convergence induced growth. 
Divergence induced growth works through cumulative causation (the Kaldor effect). 
Convergence induced growth works via Thirlwall’s Law (Thirlwall effect).  
 
Whether ultimately, the growth of the leader economy will result in convergent or 
divergent growth will depend on the relative strength of both effects. The predominance 
of the Kaldor over the Thirlwall effect leads to divergence. Contrarily the predominance 
of the Thirlwall over the Kaldor effects leads to convergence.  Formally within the logic 
of the model this reduces to the proposition that convergence/divergence depends on 
whether the income export-to-import elasticities of the follower is greater/smaller than 
the difference in the induced productivity coefficients (see Table 1 below for a summary 
of the basic here sued and its variations). 
 
 Thus while growth simply happens as long as the leader economy grows, unless 
the follower economy is already converging to the leader, achieving convergence requires 
specific policies to change the elasticity parameters and/or the induced productivity 
coefficients. That is policies are needed to ensure that the Thirlwall effect predominates 
over the Kaldor effect.  
 
Needless to say, these policies must be consistent and the lack of consistency may 
defeat the purpose of convergence. As an example depending on the context, 
circumstance and sequencing, a policy geared to improve the valued added content of 
exports (which would increase the export elasticity of income,pi ) can clash with a trade 
liberalization policy which can result in an increase of the income elasticity of imports 
(ξ ).  
Table 1 
Summary of the types of models and conditions for convergence 
Types of 
models 
Model formalization Kaldor 
effect 
Thirwall effect Conditions for convergence 
Basic 
model 
(M1) 
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  Nevertheless the design and implementation of policies to achieve the right 
balance between the ratio of income elasticities ( piξ ) and that of induced productivity 
coefficients ( l
f
λ
λ ) such that 
l
f
λpi
ξ λ> can be a difficult task. It requires enormous and 
conscious efforts of coordination and wide and effective policy leverage to change the 
above parameters.  
 
This point is illustrated through a calibration exercise for the case of Central 
American countries and Mexico, a set of follower countries, whose economic fortunes are 
closely linked to those of a leader country, i.e., the United States. Table 2 below shows 
the import-export elasticity parameters for Central American countries and Mexico and 
the induced productivity coefficients for these countries and the United States.  
 
The import-export elasticity parameters correspond to different estimates found in 
the literature for different time periods and also in the case of the export elasticity 
parameters own estimations are included. The value of the induced productivity 
coefficient for the United States (the leader country) was set at 0.6 which is at the highest 
end of the range of estimates found for advanced countries.18 In the case of Central 
American countries and Mexico, the value for the induced productivity coefficient was 
set at 0.2 which is below the lowest value found for advanced countries (see Footnote 
18).  
 
The exercise in question seeks to determine the value of the export elasticity 
parameter that given the maximum and minimum import elasticity parameters found in 
the BPC literature and the induced productivity coefficients, would ensure, according to 
the basic model presented in the paper, that growth in the leader country generate 
convergence in productivity for the follower country.  
 
As can be readily seen, in the best and most optimist of the cases which is that 
derived from using the minimum value for the import elasticity of demand and the 
highest value for the export elasticity of exports, the export elasticity parameter would 
have to increase by at least 1.45 and 1.58 points to ensure convergence in productivity in 
Mexico and Costa Rica; more than double in the case of El Salvador; and more than triple 
in the case of Guatemala (see Table 2 below). 
  
 
 
                                                 
18
 The estimates of the Verdoorn coefficient range from 0.3 to 0.6 for advanced countries. See McCombie 
(2002, p.106). 
Table 2 
Calibration exercise using the basic model to obtain the export elasticity of income required for convergence in producivity 
Countries ξ  pi  λ  rpi  
 Pacheco 
López 
1977-2002 
Senhadji 
1960-1993 
Perraton 
1973-1995 
Pérez Caldentey  
and  
Moreno Brid 
1950-1997 
Moreno Brid and  
Pérez Caldentey 
1950-1999 
Own 
estimates 
1960-2005 
 With 
Maximum 
ξ  
With 
Minimum 
 ξ  
Costa Rica 2.27 1.21 1.76 1.69 2.64 2.31 0.2 >6.81 >3.63 
El Salvador 2.47 1.47 … 0.95 2.24 1.42 0.2 >7.41 >2.85 
Guatemala 3.78 … … 1.35 1.07 1.38 0.2 >11.34 >4.05 
Honduras 1.41 0.74 0.56 0.92 … … 0.2 … … 
Nicaragua 0.97 0.57 … 1.92 … … 0.2 … … 
Mexico 3.17 1.31 … … … 2.70 0.2 >9.51 >3.93 
United States - - - - - - 0.6 … … 
Note:  
… denotes not available. In the case of the United States the only required value was that corresponding to the induced productivity coefficient. 
rpi refers to the export elasticity of income required for convergence. It was computed implicitly using the equation of the basic model (i.e., Eq. 
(8)), and the minimum and maximum export-import elasticities of income of the different estimations provided.  
 
Source: Pacheco López (2009); Senhadji (1998); Perraton (2003); Pérez Caldentey and Moreno Brid (1999); Moreno-Brid and Pérez Caldentey 
(2003). 
The exercise above is only one of different calibration exercises that can be 
undertaken using the above model. Other exercises can include higher levels of 
complexity and not necessarily place the weight of the adjustment on the export elasticity 
parameter.   
 
Adjustment to ensure convergence can be brought about by changes also in the 
induced productivity of the follower country, or its import elasticity or a combination of 
the different parameters used in the model. The point of the exercise was to highlight the 
fact that under balance-of-payments constraint conditions achieving convergence requires 
major and fundamental policy changes.  
 
Further research steps in this direction, which fall outside the scope of this paper, 
but are a natural complement to it, is first to ascertain the conditions under which, if any, 
policy makers can effectively manipulate the above parameters for convergence in 
productivity. A second line of analysis worth pursuing is to inquire whether a change in 
the international financial architecture geared to remove the BPC constraint is a possible 
feasible alternative  
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